Misappropriation without Violence in Texas by Steele, Walter W., Jr.
SMU Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 4 Article 6
1956
Misappropriation without Violence in Texas
Walter W. Steele Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walter W. Steele Jr., Misappropriation without Violence in Texas, 10 Sw L.J. 415 (1956)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol10/iss4/6
COMMENTS
terclaim because of the jurisdictional limits of the court, and if
this defendant shall assert his cause of action in the proper court
and make a motion to consolidate the two suits, then the two suits
may be consolidated in the higher court where each party may
present his claims.
CONCLUSION
The main problem in the field of concurrent jurisdiction be-
tween the federal courts and the state courts lies in the simple ques-
tion of which court shall act when both courts are petitioned at
the same time with causes of action which arise from the same
transaction. Since each court is bound only by the necessity of
orderly procedure in our court systems, the simple question be-
comes complex.
The passage of the compulsory counterclaim rule for the fed-
eral system has alleviated many of the probems within this sphere.
However, the more important fact as concerns Rule 13a is the
construction given to the rule by the state courts when a cause of
action is asserted there, which cause of action should have been
a compulsory counterclaim in a prior pending action in the
federal courts. It is felt that the abatement of the action by some
state courts in favor of the prior jurisdiction of the federal courts
has been the proper construction and a wise solution to a complex
problem. It is hoped that other state courts when faced with the
problem will follow the lead.
Jere G. Hayes.
MISAPPROPRIATION WITHOUT VIOLENCE IN TEXAS
PREFACE
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the law of theft by
false pretext, swindling, embezzlement, and theft by bailee in
Texas. The emphasis of the discussion will be on the law as it
actually exists; suggestions of what the law should be will be
limited to the discussion of conflicting cases.'
I For suggested legislative reform see Stumberg, Criminal Appropriation of Mo,.
ables -A Need for Legislative Reform, 19 TExAs L REv. 117 (1941).
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The text will be presented in outline form. The crimes natur-
ally group themselves into two segments: the swindling-theft by
false pretext unit, and the embezzlement-theft by bailee unit. At
the beginning of each unit the reader will find a short explanation
of the statutes without reference to the case law. Following will be
a discussion of the elements of the crimes, and finally a discussion
of the overlap and confusion which exists between them.
SWINDLING - THEFT BY FALSE PRETEXT
Statutes Applicable
Swindling is defined as follows:
"Swindling" is the acquisition of any personal or movable property,
money or instrument of writing conveying or securing a valuable right,
by means of some false or deceitful pretense or device, or fraudulent
representation, with intent to approriate the same to the use of the party
so acquiring, or of destroying or impairing the right of the party justly
entitled to the same.2
Theft by false pretext is described in this manner:
The taking must be wrongful, so that if the property came into the
possession of the person accused of theft by lawful means, the sub-
sequent appropriation of it is not theft, but if the taking, though origi.
nally lawful, was obtained by any false pretext, or with any intent
to deprive the owner of the value thereof, and appropriate the property
to the use and benefit of the person taking, and the same is so appro-
priated, the offense of theft is complete.3
It appears from a comparison of the two statutes that the defini-
tion of swindling is an extension of the definition of theft by false
pretext, including a more complete description of the type of prop-
erty subject to the crime and the deceit necessary for the consumma-
tion of the offense. The only obvious distinction between the two
crimes is provided by Art. 1548, TEX. PEN. CODE (1925).' This
statute declares that for the crime of swindling it is not necessary
2 Tax. PEN. CODE (1925), art. 1545.
aTEx. PEN. CODE (1925), art. 1413.
4 "It is not necessary in order to constitute the offense of swindling that any benefit
shall accrue to the person guilty of the fraud or deceit, nor that any injury shall result
to the person intended to be defrauded if it is sufficiently apparent that there was a
wilful design to receive benefit or cause an injury."
[Vol. 10
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that the accused derive any benefit or cause any injury as long as
he has the intent to do so. This seems to be opposed to the language
of Art. 1413, which defines theft by false pretext and expressly
states that the accused must have the intent to appropriate the
goods and that the goods must be so appropriated.
Although it might appear that the statutes are repetitious of
each other, they were actually designed to cover two distinct
crimes. As the next few pages will demonstrate, the distinctions
have gradually disappeared until at present the crimes are, in
fact, very similar.
Elements of Swindling
The concept of swindling was evolved to cover a hiatus in the
common law of theft. At common law there could be no theft if
the title to the stolen goods had passed from the victim to the ac-
cused, for if title had passed there could be no wrongful taking.
This point was aptly expressed in Kellog v. State: '
Where the owner intends to transfer, not the possession merely, but also
the title to the property, although induced thereto by the fraudulent
pretenses of the taker, the taking and carrying away do not constitute
larceny. The title vests in the taker, and he cannot be guilty of larceny.
He commits no trespass. He does not take and carry away the goods of
another, but the goods of himself.
The crime of swindling was conceived to cover the circumstance
where by misrepresentations of one sort or another a person was
induced to part with the title as well as the possession of his prop-
erty. Thus the element of passage of title is an essential part of
the crime of swindling.6 Other than the element of intent, the only
other important component of swindling is the type of misrepre-
sentation used by the accused. The misrepresentations may not
be in the nature of promises or predictions of future events, but
must relate solely to the present or past.' This point, along with
the fact that the misrepresentation must be relied upon, often
5 26 Ohio St. 15, 19 (1874).
6 For a discussion of the passage of title as a distinction between swindling and
theft by false pretext see pp. 419-420.
7Anderson v. State, 177 S.W. 85 (Tex. Grim. 1915); Dixon v. State, 215 S.W.2d
181 (Tex. Grim. 1948). Nor is it necessary that the misrepresentations be verbal in
nature; the conduct and acts of the party are sufficient.
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causes confusion as will be explained more fully in the section
analyzing the overlap between swindling and theft by false pretext.
These four elements-passage of title, misrepresentations of
the present or past, reliance upon the misrepresentation, and in-
tent at time of taking--complete the crime of swindling. Since
the passage of Art. 1549, declaring that the State may elect to
prosecute for either swindling or theft by false pretext where the
facts indicate both crimes, and the liberal interpretation given
this statute by such cases as King v. State,' indictments for swind-
ling are rare.
Elements of Theft by False Pretext
The most obvious element of theft by false pretext is, as the
name implies, the use of a false pretext to carry out the act. A good
example of the confusion this element has caused is Roe v. State,
which involved a sale of cattle.' The seller never received pay-
ment due to the fact that the defendant misrepresented the size
of his bank account. The trial court refused to give the jury
charges concerning the misrepresentations that were made, leav-
ing the case to be decided upon the element of intent at the time
of taking. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed on the grounds
that the trial court's refusal was error. On motion for rehearing
the State argued that the presence or absence of false representa-
tions was not essential to the crime, and relied on the word "or"
as contained in the definition of theft by false pretext.1" The court
held this to be an unsound theory. Judge Graves dissented, agree-
ing with the State that the statute clearly sets out two separate
methods of prosecution.
It appeared that the problem of whether or not the use of a false
pretext is a necessary element of the crime was conclusively settled
when in 1946 the court decided the case of Hesbrook v. State.1
In this case the court made the following emphatic statement:
It is now the settled law of this State that a false pretext is necessary
to constitute the crime of theft by false pretext. The intent to deprive
8213 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Crim. 1948).
9 144 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Crim. 1940).
10,...if the taking ... was obtained by any false pretext, or with any intent to
deprive the owner of the value thereof..." Tax. PEN. CODE (1925), art. 1413. [Empha-
sis added.]
11 194 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim.).
[Vol. 10
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the owner of the property and subsequent appropriation of it, alone,
is not sufficient. 12
Unfortunately the law on this point is unsettled once more due to
the recent decision in Wade v. State. 8 In this case the defendant
borrowed his friend's car and converted the property he found in
the trunk. A conviction for theft by false pretext was upheld with-
out even so much as a discussion of the point of whether any
false pretext was used to induce the transfer of possession (ap-
parently it was not). As Judge Davidson pointed out in his
dissent,
... the majority opinion overrules, without justification or reason, a
long line of established precedents [speaking of Hesbrook decision
among others] and, in so doing, leaves the law relative to theft by false
pretext under Art. 1413, Vernon's P.C.... in a state of confusion and
uncertainty.' 4
A close reading of the majority opinion in the Wade case will
indicate that the court did not actually overrule the earlier de-
cisions on the point of use of a false pretext, but rather ignored
the problem completely.
In those cases where a false pretext is used (thereby avoiding
the question of whether or not it is necessary) there is the further
qualification that it must be the inducing cause for the transfer
of possession of the property from the injured to the accused."
In other words, the false pretext must be relied upon. In addition,
and contrary to the law on swindling, the false pretext may con-
sist of a promise of things to come in the future.'6
Another element of the crime is that the property must be ac-
tually appropriated to the use and benefit of the taker.' There-
fore, the venue for the crime is always in the county where the
property is actually received, and not necessarily the county
where the representations or promises are made.'
The remaining element of theft by false pretext is passage of
title. As pointed out earlier, the crime of swindling was based
12 Id. at 261.
13 275 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Crim. 1955).
14 Id. at 667.
15 Nichols v. State, 109 S.W.2d 1057 (Tex. Crim. 1937).
16 Gibson v. State, 214 S.W. 341 (Tex. Crim. 1919).
17 King v. State, 213 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Crim. 1948).
18 Sims v. State, 13 S.W. 653 (Tex. Crim. 1890).
1956]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
upon the need for a statute to cover situations where the felonious
act would have constituted theft, except that the title to the prop-
erty passed with the possession. For this reason the earlier cases
held that if the title to the property passed, the crime must be
swindling, but if the title did not pass then the crime was theft
by false pretext.19 Oddly enough, the Court of Criminal Appeals
usually concerned itself with the question of whether it was in-
tended by the parties that the title should pass, rather than the
question of whether the title had actually passed as a matter of
law. This gave rise to some confusing doctrine, as illustrated by
the case of Anderson v. State 20 which held that the use of false
representations in a sales transaction would block the passage of
title. Needless to say, the notion that false representations or
promises prevent title from passing is not sound. If false state-
ments or promises prevented title from passing then there could
never be a swindle, for the very misrepresentations which are a
necessary element of the crime of swindling would avert the
passage of title which is also a necessary element of the crime.
This point created so much confusion 21 that the court soon came
up with another theory to solve the problem. In Contreras v.
State 22 the court held that the passage of title was a distinction
between the two crimes but was not to be considered controlling.
The most recent cases on the subject have gone so far as to de-
clare that the element of passage or non-passage of title as a dis-
tinction between theft by false pretext and swindling is a "fal-
lacy" 28 and no longer exists in Texas.2' It is to be hoped that this
point is forever settled.
One collateral issue should be considered at this time. It may
seem from the foregoing analysis of these two crimes that they
present an ideal medium for a merchant selling on credit to
coerce his customers into payment by threatening criminal prose-
cution for breach of their promise to pay. Apparently the court
has seen the danger in such a situation. In the case of Rundell v.
19 Bink v. State, 98 S.W. 249 (Tex. Crim. 1906).
20 177 S.W. 85 (Tex. Crim. 1915).
21 Segal v. State, 265 S.W. 911 (Tex. Crim. 1924) ; De Blanc v. State, 37 S.W.2d
1024 (Tex. Crim. 1931).
22 39 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Crim. 1931).
28 Johnson v. State, 162 S.W.2d 980, 982 (Tex. Crim. 1942).
24 Bomar v. Insurors Indemnity & Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 484, 242 S.W.2d 160, 162 (1951).
[Vol. 10
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State Judge Morrow by way of concurring opinion said, "If prop-
erty is obtained on credit by false representations of existing
facts, there may be a prosecution for swindling, but if the credit is
obtained upon the simple promise to pay, accompanied by no
fraudulent representations of existing facts, the prosecution for
theft cannot be maintained." 25 It is submitted that this is a sound
rule of law and should be followed in all cases which involve the
common credit sale transaction between merchant and customer.
The elements of theft by false pretext may be summarized as
follows:
1. Intent at the time of taking.
2. Appropriation to the use and benefit of the accused.
3. False representation of the present, past, or future (pos-
sibly this element is not necessary).
4. Reliance upon the misrepresentation (if present).
5. Title may or may not pass (true under most recent theory).
Swindling-Theft by False Pretext: Overlap
Now that the court has settled the point that passage of title is
not a distinction between the crimes of theft by false pretext and
swindling, the main source of confusion is the fact that for swind.
ling there can be no misleading statements or promises concerning
future events. This is made complex because of the inducing cause
rule discussed earlier.26 Where there are misrepresentations of all
three types (past, present, and future) it is often extremely diffi-
cult to determine which statement is the inducing cause of the
crime. The conclusion ultimately reached is often no more than
the personal opinion of the court deciding the particular case, and
this naturally leads to inconsistent opinions.
Boscow v. State 27 was a case involving a defendant who mis-
represented that he was a doctor and promised to cure the wife of
Mr. D; in return Mr. D gave the defendant advance payments.
The defendant was indicted for swindling, his defense being that
25 235 S.W. 908, 911 (Tex. Crim. 1920). See also Massey v. State, 266 S.W.2d 880.
885 (Tex. Crim. 1954).
26Supra note 15.
27 26 S.W. 625 (Tex. Crim. 1894).
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the fraudulent promise took the facts out of the scope of the crime.
The court said:
It is true that, if the witness Dunn had relied alone on the promise, it
could not be swindling; but, where the promise is connected with the
false pretense of an existing fact, as that he was a physician, and at
that very time associated with other physicians . . . it would support
the charge. 28
The same line of reasoning was followed by the court in the case
of Pickens v. State 29 where the misrepresentation was that the de-
fendant was in a position to get one McNulty a job on the police
force and the fraudulent promise was that he would do so upon
the payment of ten dollars. Once again the indictment was for
swindling, and once again the defendant contended that the fraudu-
lent promise took the facts out of the scope of that crime. The
court reasoned, "In this case, however, his promise or guaranty
to do something in future was an incident of his false representa-
tions, etc., that he was in a position and able to secure for McNulty
a position on the police force." " These two decisions failed to
influence the court in the case of New v. State.8 The defendant, who
was indicted for swindling, had represented to Mr. R that he was
an agent of the Ben E. New Co. and that if Mr. R would assign
his bank account to the defendant, he would deliver in return
guaranteed bonds of the United Post Office Corp. The Court of
Criminal Appeals held that since the inducing misrepresentation
was of a future event (that the bonds would be delivered) the
indictment for swindling could not stand. The court held further
that the fact that some of the representations were of present
facts (that the defendant was an agent of the Ben E. New Co.
and that the bonds were guaranteed) was no indication that
crime was swindling because they were not the inducing cause
of the transaction. When, on motion for rehearing, the State called
the court's attention to its holdings in the Boscow and Pickens
cases, the court replied:
We are not unmindful of the holdings in the cases named, nor of
expressions in other cases which make it difficult for prosecuting
28 d. at 626.
29180 S.W. 234 (Tex. Crim. 1915).
old. at 235.
31 83 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Crim. 1935).
[Vol. 10
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officers and trial courts to know what is the proper course to pursue
under a given state of facts. Whether successful or not, we have made
an earnest effort in the cases cited in our original opinion to clear away
some of the doubt occasioned by the state of our decisions on the point
under consideration. If the result of our effort has been to add further
confusion, it is much to be regretted.3 2
These cases aptly illustrate the inherent difficulty of applying
the inducing cause rule, but it is respectfully submitted that much
of the difficulty has been caused by the court itself. The court has
failed to adopt a theory for application of the rule, such as found
in the Boscow case, and apply it consistently by use of the prin-
ciple of stare decisis. The result has been numerous conflicting
opinions, each a theory unto itself.
Swindling-Theft by False Pretext: State's Election
Much of the confusion caused by the inducing cause rule has
been alleviated by the passage of Art. 1549 declaring that where
the elements of both crimes are present the State may elect to pros-
ecute for either. Thus if the State chooses to prosecute for theft by
false pretext, which it usually does, it is no defense to say that the
crime is swindling.3 Although the statute requires that the ele-
ments of both crimes be present, it has been interpreted liberally
and used successfully in many cases which present only a trace of
the elements of both crimes. In King v. State,"' for example, the
defendant bought an automobile and paid for it by check. He
represented that he had the money in the bank (a present mis-
representation) and that the check would be paid upon presenta-
tion (a promise). Under the inducing cause rule it seems that the
promise would be ignored and the crime would be swindling;
however, by virtue of the statute now under discussion, the court
upheld a conviction for theft by false pretext in the face of the
defense that the crime was swindling. The court said:
32 d. at 670.
83 "Where property, money, or other articles of value enumerated in the definition
of swindling, are obtained in such manner that the acquisition thereof constitutes both
swindling and some other offense, the party thus offending shall be amenable to
prosecution at the state's election for swindling or for such other offense committed
by him by the unlawful acquisition of said property in such manner." TEX. PWs. CODE
(1925) art. 1549.




If, however, the facts of this case should be held to constitute swindling
under art. 1545, P.C., it cannot be successfully asserted that the facts
would not authorize a jury to find that possession of the automobile
was obtained by false pretext,... with the intent to appropriate the
same to the use and benefit of the appellant. Under such circum-
stances, he would also be guilty of theft by fraudulent pretext.8 5
Conclusion
It is submitted that according to the most recent decisions the
crime of theft by false pretext now includes the crime of swin-
dling. Swindling requires an intent at the time of taking, as does
theft by false pretext. For swindling the title to the property in
question must pass, but for theft by false pretext it makes no dif-
ference. For swindling there must be a misrepresentation of a
present or past fact, while for theft by false pretext the false
statement (if necessary at all) may even extend to a promise of
things to come in the future. The only time that it might be said
that theft by false pretext does not include the crime of swindling
is in a circumstance where the defendant has derived no benefit
from the act, or caused injury thereby, so that Art. 1548 6 is
applicable.
The fact that theft by false pretext embraces the crime of swin-
dling, when taken in connection with Art. 1549,1 provides a tool
which may be used by the prosecutor to avoid all of the conflict-
ing cases and confusion discussed earlier. The answer to the whole
problem is that the prosecutor should always bring his indictment
for theft by false pretext.
Suppose a case where X and Y are good friends. X represents
that he has just inherited $10,000 and promises that he will give
it all to Y in return for a deed to Y's house. Y delivers the deed.
In fact X is lying and Y is never paid. Suppose further that the
prosecutor brings an indictment for swindling. The court is im-
mediately met with the problem of interpreting the inducing cause
rule, for in order to convict for swindling it must be established
that the inducing cause of the transfer was not the promise to pay,
but the statement that X had inherited $10,000. On the other
35 Id. at 543.
36 Supra note 4.
87 Supra note 33.
(Vol. 10
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hand, if the prosecutor brings the indictment for theft by false
pretext the inducing cause rule is not an issue. It is believed that
the court, through the use of Art. 1549, has come to the point of
holding that as long as there is a fraudulent promise in the facts
the crime may be theft by false pretext regardless of whether or
not the promise was the inducing cause. This was apparently the
basis of the decision in the King case."8 In other words, as long
as the indictment is brought for theft by false pretext the prob-
lem of which statement is the inducing cause is immaterial.
For further illustration consider the recent case of Massey v.
State.89 The prosecuting witness testified that he sold property to
the defendant solely in reliance on the defendant's statement that
a check was in the mail. This was a perfect case of swindling; the
title to the goods had passed and the only false statement made
was one concerning a present or past fact. The court sustained a
conviction for theft by false pretext and said:
Whether the facts show theft by false pretext or swindling need not be
determined, for the state was authorized to maintain this prosecution
for theft by false pretext upon facts which might also show swindling.
[citing Art. 1549 and the King case]' 0
As previously indicated, the only time an indictment should
ever be brought for swindling is in a situation where the accused
has derived no benefit from his crime. An example of this would
be where the accused by the use of false statements secures a check
from his victim, but is apprehended before he has a chance to
cash it. In such a case the prosecutor would be forced to bring the
indictment for swindling and contend with the agonizing problems




The statute defining theft by bailee prescribes that:
Any person having possession of personal property of another by virtue
of a contract of hiring or borrowing, or other bailment, who shall
"s Supra note 35.
39 266 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Crim. 1954).
40 Id. at 885.
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without consent of the owner, fraudulently convert such property to
his own use with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the same,
shall be guilty of theft, and shall be punished as for theft of like
property. 41
Embezzlement is defined as follows:
If any officer, agent, clerk, employ6, or attorney at law or in fact, or any
incorporated company or institution, or any clerk, agent, attorney at
law or in fact, servant or employ6 of any private person, copartner-
ship or joint stock association, or any consignee or bailee of money or
property, shall embezzle, fraudulently misapply or convert to his own
use without the consent of his principal or employer, any money or
property of such principal or employer which may have come into his
possession or be under his care by virtue of such office, agency or
employment, he shall be punished in the same manner as if he had
committed a theft of such money or property. 42
The embezzlement statute includes the term "bailee" as one
who can be guilty of the crime of embezzlement, but since the
statute defining theft by bailee is broad enough to cover any kind
of bailment, it is believed that it could be used exclusively. At
least there is nothing apparent from the face of the statutes them-
selves which would indicate otherwise. The following discussion
of the cases will disclose that this interpretation of the statutes has
not been followed.
Elements of Theft by Bailee
The most complex part of the crime of theft by bailee is the
nature of the bailment itself. The type of bailment contemplated
by the statute is usually defined in this way:
A bailment is a delivery of goods for some purpose under contract,
express or implied, that after the purpose has been fulfilled, they should
be redelivered to the bailor, or afterwards dealt with according to his
direction, or kept until he reclaims them.' 8
This definition of bailment has three elements: delivery, contrac-
tual purpose, and return of the goods.
A perfect example of a case where there was no delivery so as
41 TEx. PEN. CoDE (1925), art. 1429.
42 Tsx. PEN. CODE (1925), art. 1534.
I "Northcutt v. State, 131 S.W. 1128, 1129 (Tex. Crim. 1910).
[Vol. 10
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to satisfy the definition is Dunlap v. State." The defendant made
a deal to trade his farm with Rogers. Deeds were executed and
delivered. When the defendant moved he took with him some fence
posts which were on the premises. Rogers contended that the de-
fendant was the bailee of these posts, and everything else on his
farm, from the day the deeds were signed. The court reversed a
conviction for theft by bailee for the reason that Rogers never
had actual possession of the posts, and obviously did not deliver
them to the defendant.
As pointed out, the bailment must also have some definite pur-
pose. In Fulcher v. State ' the defendant was given $500 too much
by mistake when he cashed a check at the bank. The state attempted
to prosecute for theft by bailee. The Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed for the reason that there was no contractual purpose in
the delivery of the money, and so there was no bailment as that
term is used in the statute.
Although the definition of bailment as set out above expressly
requires a return of the goods, there has been some confusion on
this point. Some cases require that there must be an intent, at
least in the mind of the bailor, that the exact same goods be re-
turned,"" while at least one case has held that this is not neces-
sary. 7 It is submitted that the latter rule is the more realistic.
Collateral to the definition of bailment is the fact that the statute
will not support a conviction where the bailment is for the exclu-
sive benefit of the bailor,"8 although it will support a conviction
where the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailee."9
The remaining element of the crime, that of intent, is now
settled in Texas. The intent to appropriate to the use of the accused
may exist at the time of the taking 50 or may be formed after the
goods have come into his possession as a bailee." Furthermore, the
property must actually be so appropriated."
44 160 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. 1942).
45 25 S.W. 625 (Tex. Crim. 1894).
48 Brown v. State, 270 S.W. 179 (Tex. Crim. 1925).
47 Lee v. State, 193 S.W. 313 (Tex. Crim. 1917).
'5 Gose v. State, 84 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. 1935); Lee v. State, 193 S.W. 313
(Tex. Crim. 1917).
'0 Williams v. State, 16 S.W. 760 (Tex. Crim. 1891).
50 Alvarez v. State, 2 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. 1928).
51 Lewis v. State, 87 S.W. 831 (Tex. Crim. 1905).
52 Purcelley v. State, 13 S.W. 993 (Tex. Crim. 1890).
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The elements of the crime may be broken-down and summar-
ized as follows:
1. There must be an actual delivery of the goods from the
bailor to the bailee.
2. The bailment must have some definite purpose.
3. It must have been the intent of the bailor that the goods be
returned (not clear whether identical goods are necessary).
4. There must be a mutual benefit bailment, or one for the
sole benefit of the bailee.
5. The intent may exist at the time the goods are bailed or
may be formed subsequently.
6. There must be an actual appropriation of the goods to the
use and benefit of the accused.
Theft by Bailee-Theft by False Pretex: Overlap
In the case of Lewis v. State " the defendant rented horses,
stating that he was going to take them to a particular place. In-
stead he went in the opposite direction and sold the horses. The
conviction was for theft by false pretext, and the defense was
that the crime was theft by bailee. The court said:
The same transaction may be an offense under both statutes; the dis-
tinction between the offenses being that under art. 861 [now art. 1413]
the fraudulent intent must exist at the very time of obtaining possession
of the property, while under art. 877 [now art. 1429] it is not necessary
that the fraudulent intent should have existed at the time the possession
of the property was obtained, but may be formed afterwards.5 4
If a bailment is induced by some false statement and there
exists at the time an intent to appropriate to the use and benefit
of the accused there seems to be no reason why the State should
not have the choice of indicting for theft by false pretext or theft
by bailee since both statutes have been violated. However, as is
usually the case, if the bailment is induced by a simple request on
the part of the defendant without any misstatement of facts or
false promises it is believed that the crime is limited to theft by




bailee. A conviction for theft by false pretext in such a situation
is a violation of what seems to be one of the established principles
of that crime, namely that a false pretext or promise must be
present.5
Elements of Embezzlement
At the common law embezzlement was unknown for the reasons
illustrated in the case of The King v. Joseph Bazeley56 Bazeley
worked in a bank. He took in some money from a customer and
put it directly into his pocket. The court discussed the existing
law and cases holding that theft was the felonious taking of an
article from the "possession" of another, and decided that there
was no larceny here because the money in question was never in
the "possession" of the complaining owners of the bank. The
court said, "The rule that the possession of the servant is the pos-
session of the master cannot be extended to a case in which the
property never Was in the master's possession .... " " As a result
of this case the first embezzlement statute was passed in England."8
In order to prove the crime of embezzlement in Texas today it
must be shown: "
1. That the defendant was the agent of the person or corpora-
tion as alleged, and by the terms of his employment was
charged with the duty of receiving the money or property
of his principal.
2. That he did so receive money belonging to his principal.
3. That he received it in the course of his employment.
4. That he embezzled, misapplied, or converted it to his
own use.
The most obvious point is that the accused must be an agent,
and the injured party his principal. ° The difficulty comes in de.
ciding just when the accused is an agent and when he is not. It
55 There is one case to the contrary, supra note 13.
662 Leach 835, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799).
57 Id. at 520.
58 An Act to Protect Masters and Others Against Embezzlement by Their Clerks
or Servants, 39 GEo. 3, c. 85.
" Taylor v. State, 16 S.W. 302 (Tex. Crim. 1891); Webb v. State, 8 Tex. Crim.
App. 310 (1880).
eo New v. State, 74 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Crim. 1934).
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was the practice of the court at one time to demand that the de-
fendant be an agent within the strict terms of the law. In Brady v.
State, 1 decided in 1886, the defendant was employed as a clerk
and cotton weigher. He collected some bills owed his employer
and converted the money. The court reversed a conviction for em-
bezzlement on the grounds that the clerk had not been given the
authority to collect bills and hence was not an agent at the time of
the act. Other early cases might be cited 62 in which the court de-
manded that before a person could be convicted of embezzlement
it must be shown that at the time he acquired the property he was
acting within the limits of his express authority as an agent, and
not simply implied authority.
Apparently the first case to break with this strict theory was
Smith v. State.68 The court distinguished the Brady case on the
facts and said:
It ought not to be required by the state that in prosecutions for em-
bezzlement it should be in peril of sustaining defeat in a just prose-
cution, because of some technical lack of specific authority in respect
to some particular act, if, under all the circumstances such authority
might reasonably be implied and found as a fact by the jury in light of
the relation existing between the parties. [emphasis added] 6'
Despite the fact that there was a strong dissent, the reasoning of
this case has been followed in one instance 65 and has been fol-
lowed and quoted from extensively in another.6
One further situation requiring discussion is that of embezzle-
ment arising out of a bailment. It will be recalled that the term
"bailee" is used in the embezzlement statute as well as in the
statute covering the crime of theft by bailee. The statute defining
embezzlement was enacted in 1858. The case of Reed v. State,7
decided in 1884, restricted the term "bailee" as used in the em-
bezzlement statute to the type of bailee found in a bailment for the
sole benefit of the bailor. The court reached this conclusion by
use of the rule of ejiusdem generis, and although the result may
6121 Tex. Ct. App. 659.
62 Loving v. State, 71 S.W. 277 (Tex. Crim. 1902).
68 109 S.W. 118 (Tex. Crim. 1908).
64 Id. at 121.
65 Powell v. State, 198 S.W. 317, 320 (Tex. Crim. 1917).
66 McCue v. State, 65 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Crim. 1933.)
67 16 Tex. Ct. App. 586.
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have been sound legally, it seems unnecessary practically. Un-
doubtedly because of this holding the statute covering theft by
bailee was enacted in 1887.68 As previously discussed this statute
is broad enough to cover any kind of bailment, and probably was
intended to do so by the legislature. Nevertheless, the law in Texas
today remains that if a theft arises from a mutual benefit bailment,
or one for the sole benefit of the bailee, the crime is theft by bailee;
if the theft arises from a bailment for the sole benefit of the
bailor, the crime is embezzlement. 9
Embezzlement-Theft by False Pretext: Overlap
In an earlier discussion under the sections dealing with theft
by bailee it was explained that where the bailment is brought
about by the use of some false pretext, the State virtually has
an election between prosecuting for theft by false pretext or
theft by bailee. Logically the same reasoning would apply in
embezzlement cases where the agency relation is created by false
pretext. An ideal situation was presented in the case of Johnson
v. State.7" The injured party (Mr. P) went to a hotel to secure a
room. There he met the defendant who told Mr. P that he was
working at the hotel and that if Mr. P had any money he had
better give it to him for safe keeping overnight. The next morn.
ing the defendant was gone and Mr. P discovered that he did not
work at the hotel. It is an established principle that a landlord
who keeps money for his tenant is a bailee for the sole benefit
of the bailor, 1 so this was a case of embezzlement under a bail-
ment induced by false pretext. The court reversed a conviction
for embezzlement on the grounds that the crime was theft by
false pretext, reasoning that the crime could not be embezzlement
because the false pretext which was used kept any fiduciary re-
lation from existing between the parties such as is necessary for
embezzlement.
Apparently contra to the holding in the Johnson case is Brown
68 Johnson v. State, 159 S.W. 849 (Tex. Crim. 1913).
69 There may be a trend to the contrary. See discussion of Erwin case, infra
note 75.
7080 S.W. 621 (Tex. Crim. 1904).
71 Supra note 68.
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v. State 2 where the defendant got money from a victim by rep-
resenting that he was a policeman, and was taking the money to
pay the victim's fine for violation of a city ordinance. The con-
viction was for embezzlement, the defendant contending that he
was guilty of theft by false pretext, if anything. The court ad-
mitted that "the question is of some interest," " but went on to
say that the defendant was an agent despite the fact that the
relation was created by false pretext. The same facts arose in the
case of Haley v. State, " and a conviction for theft by false pretext
was affirmed. The court did not raise the issue of whether or not
the defendant could be considered an agent.
These cases are altogether too contradictory for a conclusion to be
drawn. Yet it might be said that there is no logical reason why
the State should not have the right to prosecute for theft by false
pretext or embezzlement at its own election provided the facts of
the crime are such that they clearly violate both statutes.
Theft by Bailee-Embezzlement: Overlap
The confusion existing between these two crimes has two
sources; first, the failure of the court to apply the well established
rule that a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor comes within
the crime of embezzlement, and second, the fact that in some
cases a bailee may also be an agent.
An example of the court's failure to apply the law concerning
thefts arising from bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor is
Erwin v. State. 5 In this case one Moore requested the defendant
to take his (Moore's) car and get some money to get Moore out of
jail. Instead, the defendant appropriated the car. The court ex-
pressly recognized that this was a bailment for the sole benefit of
the bailor, and yet upheld a conviction for theft by bailee. This
case may indicate a new trend on the part of the court to broaden
the application of Art. 1429 defining theft by bailee, but until the
established precedents are expressly overruled such attempts
only create confusion.
72 270 S.W. 179 (Tex. Crim. 1925).
78 Id. at 180.
74 75 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Crim. 1934).
75 212 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. 1948).
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There are numerous cases involving conviction for theft by
bailee where it appears that the bailee was actually a servant or
agent of the injured party. 6 In the case of Rick v. State " the de-
fendant was hired to go to another city to secure an automobile.
To pay for the automobile he was given a check which he con-
verted to his own use. The court upheld a conviction for theft by
bailee without discussing the obvious employment relationship
which could make the crime embezzlement. Apparently in these
situations the State may elect to prosecute for either embezzlement
or theft by bailee at its discretion. There is authority for this
proposition in an early Texas case.78
CONCLUSION
The elements of these crimes when taken separately are actually
not difficult; the confusion arises from the fact that the crimes
are so similar in nature, and when taken as a whole their elements
become a maze of fine distinctions calculated to drive even the
most astute to despair. Part of the confusion is undoubtedly
caused by lack of adequate time to completely research the law
on each case presented.9
It is encouraging to note that the court has apparently solved
most of the problems connected with the crimes of swindling and
theft by false pretext. In so doing they received valuable assistance
from the legislature in the form of Art. 1549, TEX. PEN. CODE
(1925). Unfortunately, many problems still exist in the embezzle-
ment-theft by bailee area such as the nature of the bailment neces-
sary to come within the term "bailee" as it is used in the statutes
defining both crimes, whether or not an agency may be created
by fraudulent misrepresentations, and exactly when is a person
an agent or a bailee.
T6 Lee v. State, 193 S.W. 313 (Tex. Crim. 1917) ; Alvarez v. State, 2 S.W. 2d 849
(Tex. Crim. 1928).
77 207 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Crim. 1947).
78 Wilson v. State, 82 S.W. 651, 652 (Tex. Crim. 1904): "Although the act may
have constituted theft of property acquired by bailment under article 877, Pen. Code
1895, that affords no reason why it should not also constitute embezzlement under the
general statute."
79 Cf. Edwards v. State, 286 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. 1955) ; and Branford v. State,
66 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Crim. 1933). Note that the facts are identical but the results
are contra, and that the Edwards case fails to cite the Branford case.
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It is hoped that the court's progress in solving the swindling-
theft by false pretext problems may be taken as an indication of
forthcoming solutions in the law of embezzlement and theft by
bailee.80
Walter W. Steele Jr.
80 For statutory solutions adopted by other states, see, LA. REV. STAT. § 14:67
(1950); WIs. STAT. § 943:20 (1955); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1290 (1944).
[VOL 10
